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Environmental regulations and managerial myopia
Abstract
It has recently been claimed that, contrary to traditional neoclassical theory, suitably chosen
environmental regulation is often beneficial for the regulated firms because it induces cost-reducing
innovations. I analyze the extent to which this position is compatible with microeconomic analysis. It
turns out that even in a framework in which organizational inefficiencies might lead to underinvestment,
environmental policy can only increase firm profits if several very specific conditions are met. These
conditions concern the type of policy, the extent of inefficiencies, the costs of potential innovation
projects and their effect on productivity and abatement costs.
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inefficiencies might lead to underinvestment, environmental policy can only increase firm profits 
if several very specific conditions are met. These conditions concern the type of policy, the extent 
of inefficiencies, the costs of potential innovation projects and their effect on productivity and 
abatement costs. 
Keywords: Environmental Regulation, Internal Inefficiencies, Innovation Offsets, Managerial 
Myopia 
 
 3
1. Introduction 
Economists usually view environmental policy as a double-edged sword: the benefits of pollution 
reduction must be weighed against the costs, including those arising at the firm level. In several 
recent contributions, Michael Porter and others took issue with this view, using case-study 
evidence.1 In many cases, the argument goes, environmental regulation induces firms to carry out 
innovations that are not only beneficial for the environment, but have additional positive effects, 
deemed innovation offsets, on productivity. For instance, the 1991 Japanese recycling law 
requires that electric appliances be easy to disassemble. Hitachi reacted to this requirement with a 
complete redesign of its washing machines and vacuum cleaners; as a result the number of parts 
fell by 15-30%, and assembly costs were also reduced. Similarly, in 1990, the Montreal Protocol 
and the U.S. clean air act forced the electronics company Raytheon to develop CFC-free cleaning 
processes for electronic circuit boards, basically using water and soap. These substitutes turned 
out to result in higher product quality and lower production costs (Porter and van der Linde 
1995a).  
Environmental economists usually regard such examples as exceptional. For instance, in their 
survey on the relation between environmental regulation and productivity in the United States, 
Jaffe et al. (1995) conclude that this relation is generally negative, though relatively weak. 
Further, in a response to Porter and van der Linde (1995a), Palmer et al. (1995, p. 120) concede 
that regulation has occasionally improved firm productivity, but they hasten to add that “with 
literally hundreds of thousands of firms subject to environmental regulation in the United States 
alone, it would be hard not to find instances where regulation has seemingly worked to a 
polluting firm’s advantage.” This attitude is closely related to the theoretical point that, if firms 
are optimizing agents, then, at least under competitive conditions, they will not benefit from 
environmental regulation. Such an argument is clearly very relevant, but it assumes away the 
organizational inefficiencies emphasized by Porter, so that it is too simple to dismiss his point on 
these grounds. To address his claim, it seems more appropriate to use a framework where 
organizational inefficiencies are possible in principle and to show why, despite such 
inefficiencies, environmental policy is unlikely to lead to profit increases for the affected firms.  
                                                 
1For example, Porter (1991), Porter and van der Linde (1995a,1995b). 
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For such an approach, it is helpful to distinguish between short-term and long-term innovation 
offsets. In some of the examples discussed by Porter, the innovations were short-term, small 
changes in processes not requiring big investments, and they had very short pay-back periods. 
The CFC example is only one of them; other interesting stories include material savings from 
recycling scraps, and, in particular, many examples where it took environmental regulation to 
induce massive energy savings; see also Cebon 1992 and De Canio 1993. These authors also 
attempt to explain why firms (and other organizations) often do not make use of opportunities for 
energy-saving in the absence of regulation. In two recent papers, Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné 
(1998,2000) move towards a more general explanation of why organizations are sometimes slow 
to pick „low-hanging fruits“, i.e., reap the benefits of certain short-term, low cost innovations. 
Essentially, the argument, which builds from organizational theories relying on bounded 
rationality (e.g. Cyert and March 1992) is as follows. Firms take time to develop organizational 
structures and routines, and these routines are adapted to the organizational environment. These 
routines cannot be changed rapidly. In particular, a firm may be lacking the routines to look for 
some kinds of profitable improvements in the absence of external pressure. In some cases, the 
necessity to comply with regulation may provide the necessary pressure. 
Contrary to the papers just quoted, this paper mainly deals with long-term innovation offsets. My 
arguments are more readily applicable to those cases where a product needs to be totally 
redesigned, involving non-trivial fixed costs, as in the Hitachi example. Of course, there is a 
straightforward argument why firms might refrain from such innovations: even if the innovation 
eventually leads to a greater cash flow, the fixed costs may be too high to justify these benefits. 
Hence, it may be perfectly rational for a firm not to implement such changes, and environmental 
regulation inducing such changes cannot be regarded as beneficial from the firm’s point of view. 
Another trivial argument why firms might often appear to be foregoing the gains of long-term 
innovations in the absence of regulation is the following: when there is uncertainty about the cash 
flows generated by any project, a firm might decide not to pursue it. If, in such a situation 
regulation leads to the implementation  of changes that are beneficial ex post and have initially 
been discarded by the firm, this may just be because a state of the world has materialized that was 
judged as unlikely initially. Hence, with the benefit of hindsight it may seem as though firms 
 5
have decided incorrectly, even though there decision was correct ex ante . In the following, I 
shall analyze a slightly more subtle point to explain why firms might refrain from cost-reducing 
innovations. I shall show that, in principle, such innovations may not even take place when they 
would increase a firm’s long-run profits, properly discounted, and I shall explore the limitations 
of this idea. 
The argument is based on incentive considerations. Decisions about such innovations with a 
long-run impact are usually not taken by firm owners, but by managers and other employees. 
Unlike the owners, these agents will usually be less concerned about the effects of their decisions 
on long-run firm profits. Instead, they will probably consider the effect on their career chances, 
on their remuneration, and on their job quality (effort, etc.). Owners can, in principle, try to align 
the employees’ objectives with the goal of profit maximization. However, this is usually not 
simple. In particular, models of Bresnahan et al. (1991), Stein (1988,1989), and Zeckhauser and 
Pound (1990) have shown that, with asymmetric information, owners will find it difficult to give 
sufficient long-run incentives for managers. The arguments are variants of the following. 
Suppose managers can devote time to different activities that increase short-term profits and 
long-run profits respectively, and the relation between effort and short-term performance is easier 
to observe than the relation between effort and long-term performance. Then, an excessive 
allocation of efforts to short-term activities might result. This problem is compounded when 
managers have a limited time horizon. If a manager expects to retire or change employers soon, 
his incentives to engage in long-run investments will be particularly low (Milgrom and Roberts 
1992, 432-433).2 
Because of these incentive problems, firms are not likely to invest enough from the owners’ point 
of view. In particular, they might refrain from innovative activities that can potentially improve 
productivity and at the same time reduce pollution, even when they are likely to increase 
expected profits.3 In principle, therefore, if managers are indeed myopic, environmental 
                                                 
2Additional incentive problems might arise in multi-divisional firms if cost-reducing innovations in one division 
yield positive externalities for other divisions. 
3There are of course possible countervailing forces. For instance, managers may engage in excessive investments to 
have a“visible impact” on the firm. 
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regulation might induce activities that increase long-term profits, and are therefore in the long-
term interests of owners.  
In this paper, I shall investigate whether these incentive issues can indeed support the idea that 
firms benefit from environmental regulation. In section 2, I shall present a simple model of 
environmental regulation in the presence of internal inefficiencies. The assumptions are chosen 
so that, on the one hand, regulation will subject firms to costs, but on the other hand, it may help 
to alleviate incentive problems between owners and managers. Using this model, I shall ask: 
under which circumstances do the positive effects of environmental regulation on expected 
profits outweigh the negative effects? Section 3 applies the general results of section 2 to two 
special cases. Section 4 interprets the findings of the model and sketches directions for future 
research. 
2 The Model 
Consider a polluting firm that operates on a product market in period 2 in a fashion that is left 
unspecified for the moment. The firm could be a monopolist, an oligopolist or a perfectly 
competitive firm. The assumptions will clarify that the innovation can be interpreted as the 
introduction of a low-pollution technology with innovation offsets. In period 1, the firm can carry 
out an investment, at costs K. I shall write I=1 if the firm invests, I=0 if it does not. Suppose first 
that the firm does not invest in period 1. Then, its technology in period 2 is described as follows. 
If the firm produces output x and makes no attempts to reduce its emissions, its production costs 
are given by C(x)  where Cx ,Cxx ≥ 0, and its emissions level is E(x), where Ex >0. If the firm 
reduces the emissions level to some e<E(x), it has to incur abatement costs R(x,e) such that  
Rx > 0, Re < 0 ; Ree > 0; Rxx ≥ 0.       (1) 
A firm that has invested in period 1 affects its production and abatement costs in period 2. If a 
firm invests, production costs are αxC(x) , αx >0; abatement costs are αeR(x,e) ; αe ≥0. Most of 
the time,  shall be concerned with the case that both production and abatement costs are lowered, 
that is, αx <1 and αe <1. In principle, however, one could also think of investments where αx >1 
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and αe <1. For instance, an end-of-the-pipe technology might reduce compliance costs but 
increase variable production costs.4 
The firm’s activity may or may not be subject to environmental regulation. For the moment, 
consider regulation as a dichotomous choice with U=1 if regulation takes place and U=0 if it 
does not. Just as market structure, the precise nature of environmental regulation is left 
unspecified for now. However, assume that for each combination of environmental policy U and 
investment I, the firm’s product market profits are uniquely determined as Π(U, I). In addition, 
we require the following assumption.  
Assumption 1: Π(0,I) > Π(1, I)  for I=0,1. 
Hence, for given levels of investment, environmental policy affects profits negatively. 
Apart from assumption 1, two further conditions will play an important role. 
Condition A (Innovation Offsets): Π(0,1) − Π(0,0) > 0 . 
Hence, if this condition holds, then, ignoring fixed costs, the effect of the innovation on firm 
profits is positive even when there is no environmental regulation. For most frameworks, this will 
hold because of the cost-reducing nature of the innovation. 
Condition B (Environmental Benefits): Π(1,1) − Π(1,0) > Π(0,1) − Π(0,0) . 
This says that the innovation has additional positive effects on profits that are relevant only when 
there is environmental policy. This is related to our earlier assumption that innovation reduces 
abatement costs and hence the costs of complying with environmental regulation, but it is not 
identical, as the examples below will show.  
 now turn to the crucial assumption of the model. Investment decisions are taken by managers. 
Motivated by the models quoted in the introduction, assume that managers and owners both 
maximize expected profits, but that managers do not operate with the discount factor that the 
owners would want to be applied. Suppose the discount factors for the owner and manager are 
δ o ∈ 0,1[ ] and δm ∈ 0,1[ ], respectively5; usually we expect that the manager’s discount factor is 
                                                 
4 Similarly, an innovation that reduces production costs at the expense of higher compliance costs would satisfy αx < 1, αe >1.  
5 As usual, the discount factor is 1 1+ r( ), where r  is the discount  rate. 
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smaller than the owner’s. This is not saying that managers are less patient than owners; it merely 
reflects the difficulties of giving them long-run incentives, arising for instance, because the 
relation between managerial activities and long-term success is harder to prove than the relation 
between these activities and short-term success, or because managers might be unsure about how 
much longer they will stay in the firm. 
Dropping indices, the expected two-period profit is δΠ(U ,1) − K  if the firm innovates; δΠ(U ,0) 
otherwise. The following result holds. 
Proposition 1:  Environmental regulation increases the expected two-period profit from the 
owner’s point of view by inducing an innovation, if and only if the following conditions hold. 
(2a) δo Π(0,1) − Π(0,0)[ ]> K >δm Π(0,1) − Π(0,0)[ ]. 
(2b) δm Π(1,1) − Π(1,0)[ ]> K . 
(2c) δo Π(1,1) − Π(0,0)[ ] > K . 
In particular, conditions A and B, and δo > δm are necessary for environmental regulation to 
increase owners’ profits. 
The result is straightforward to prove. The intuition for the conditions is as follows. 
(2a) Without environmental policy there must be a genuine conflict of interest between owners 
and managers. Specifically, the owner would like the innovation to be carried out, because the 
resulting increase in profits weighed with the owner’s discount factor exceeds the fixed costs, 
while the manager would prefer to abstain from innovation, because the resulting increase in 
profits weighed with the manager’s discount factor is lower than the fixed cost. Even if condition 
A holds, that is, innovation offsets exist, this can obviously only happen if δ o > δm : then, the 
profit increase Π(0,1) − Π(0,0)  resulting from the innovation may be high enough to justify the 
initial fixed costs from the owner’s point of view, while the managers do not put enough weight 
on the future to carry out the decision.  
(2b) Environmental regulation must solve the conflict of interest by inducing the manager to 
invest. This might happen if condition B holds. Then, environmental regulation makes the 
innovation more attractive because, apart from the productivity effects, abatement costs become 
relevant as well. Even the manager who weighs the future less than the owner may be induced to 
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carry out this innovation because under condition B, the benefits from innovation are higher than 
without regulation.  
(2c) For the owner, the beneficial effect δ o Π(1,1) − Π(1,0)[ ] of environmental policy (the 
manager is induced to innovate) must not only outweigh the fixed costs K, but also the negative 
effect of compliance δ o Π(0,0) − Π(1,0)[ ]. This is equivalent with (2c). Note that this condition 
implies the first inequality in (2a). For suppose an owner prefers innovation and regulation to no 
innovation and no regulation. Then he must at least prefer innovation without regulation to no 
innovation without regulation by assumption 1. 
To sum up, beyond the requirement that innovation offsets exist and managers do not face 
adequate incentives, three further (non-trivial) conditions must be fulfilled for environmental 
regulation to increase profits. In the next section, I shall give specific examples to show that these 
three conditions can, in principle, be satisfied simultaneously, and to clarify comparative statics. 
Before doing so, some additional  remarks on the source of the problem are in order. So far, the 
difference between the discount rates of managers and principals was simply taken as given. Is 
there anything the owners could do to solve the problems resulting from short-termism? There 
are certainly some possibilities here. For instance, suppose frequent job change is the reason why 
managers do not give much weight to the long term. Suitable long-term contracts, where 
employees pay an up-front bond and face an increasing wage profile afterwards, could act as a 
remedy. However, such contracts may be costly for the firms ⎯ employees are likely to demand 
compensation for the implied loss in mobility. Alternatively, the principal might want to induce 
long-term effort by rewarding them particularly generously when actions turn out to have 
favorable long-term effects. Again, there is a clear limitation for such an approach: the more time 
has passed between managerial decision and the outcome of the decision, the less clear is the 
causal relation between the two. Hence, to some extent trying to reward the long-term would 
have to rely on measuring the unmeasurable.  
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3 Examples 
In this section, I shall consider two examples with a specified type of regulation and behavior of 
the firm, so as to understand more precisely what conditions (2a)-(2c) mean. 
Example 1 
Consider a monopolist who produces a homogeneous good in period 2 with emissions as a by-
product. If the firm does not innovate, it produces with constant unit costs c and a maximal 
emissions level of 1 per unit output. Hence, using the terminology of the last section, if the firm 
innovates, its unit production costs are αxc  for the maximal emissions level, and reduction costs 
are αe R(x,e). Finally, assume that the firm faces unit demand: up to a reservation value of p, 
consumers are willing to buy one unit of the good produced by the monopolist. For higher values, 
demand is zero.  
When there is no environmental regulation, the firm’s profit in period 2 is therefore given as 
Π(0,1) = p − αxc  if it innovates, Π(0,0)=p-c if it does not. 
Now suppose there is environmental regulation. First, as a benchmark case consider a very rigid 
form of regulation demanding that the firm achieves the emissions target e*, using the existing 
end-of-the-pipe abatement technology. Suppose the reduction costs necessary to fulfill this 
requirement are r=R(1,e*)>0. Hence, with rigid environmental regulation and without 
innovation, the firm’s profits are Π(1,0)=p-c-r, with innovation they are Π(1,1) = p − αxc − r . 
Then, condition B is not satisfied. Intuitively, as environmental regulation demands the 
introduction of the end-of the-pipe technology, the costs of compliance are the costs of 
introducing this technology, no matter whether the innovation takes place or not. Hence, the 
following result is obvious.  
Corollary 1: In this example, end-of-the pipe-regulation never increases profits. 
Now suppose that firms still have to reduce emissions by the same amount, but regulation is more 
flexible in the sense that it does not specify the use of the end-of-the-pipe technology, but also 
allows the firm to introduce an innovation. Hence, expected net profit in period 2 is 
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Π(1,1) = p − αxc − αer  if the innovation is carried out. If, in spite of this “flexible” regulation, a 
firm does not innovate, and applies the existing end-of-the-pipe technology, Π(1,0) = p − c − r .  
Total expected profit for a firm facing flexible regulation is δΠ(1,1) − K =δ p − α xc − αer[ ]− K  if 
it innovates; δΠ(1,0)=δ p − c − r[ ] otherwise. When there is no regulation, total expected profit 
for the firm is δΠ(0,1) − K =δ p − α xc[ ]− K  if it innovates; δΠ(0,0) =δ p − c[ ] otherwise.  
In this setting, application of proposition 1 yields the following result. 
Corollary 2: Environmental regulation increases the expected two-period profit from the owner’s 
point of view by inducing an innovation if and only if the following conditions hold. 
(3a) δo 1 −α x( )c > K > δm 1− αx( )c . 
(3b) δm 1 −α x( )c + 1− αe( )r[ ]> K . 
(3c) δo 1− α x( )c − δoαer[ ]> K .. 
For the proof, note that conditions (3a)-(3c) correspond to (2a)-(2c) of proposition 1 for the 
special case under consideration. 
Corollary 2 has some straightforward comparative statics implications, which are summarized as 
follows. 
Corollary 3  For the owner to benefit from environmental regulation, it is necessary that: 
• δm is smaller than δo , but not too small. 
• αe  is sufficiently small;  
• αx  is neither to high nor too small relative to K. 
The intuition for the result goes as follows. δm  must be smaller than δo , for otherwise there is no 
incentive problem that can be solved by environmental regulation ((3a) does not hold).6 
However, if δm  becomes too small, then even with environmental regulation the manager will not 
innovate ((3b) does not hold). The greater the effect of the new technology on abatement costs, 
i.e., the smaller αe , the more likely it is that the manager will be induced to innovate by 
environmental policy ((3b)), and the more likely it is that the benefits of environmental policy 
                                                 
6Of course, if managers have higher discount factors than owners rather than lower ones, there still is an incentive 
problem, but from the owners point of view managers will invest too much rather than too little. Hence, if 
environmental regulation makes innovation more attractive, it tends to exacerbate the incentive problems. 
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exceed the costs from the owner’s point of view ((3c)). The size of αx  relative to K indicates the 
positive effect of innovation when there is no regulation: the smaller αx , the greater this effect. 
On the one hand, this effect must be large enough that, without regulation, the owner wants the 
innovation (left hand side of (3a)). On the other hand, it must not be too large; otherwise the 
manager innovates even without regulation (right hand side of (3a)). 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
FIGURES 1-4: Example 1 for parameter values   δo= 1; c= 0,5; k= 0,2; r= 0,25 
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⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Figures 1-4 show the implications of changes in the managerial discount factor, the abatement 
cost effect  and the productivity effect  of innovation. In all of these figures, parameters are fixed 
at δo = 1; c = 0.5; K = 0.2; r = 0.25 . The managerial discount factor is δm = 0.75  in Figure 1, 
δm = 0.5  in Figure 2; δm = 0.4  in Figure 3; δm = 0.3  in Figure 4. Lines (a), (b) and (c) 
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correspond to conditions (3a)-(3c) of corollary 2.7 The set A consists of all vectors (αe ,αx ) for 
which innovation offsets dominate over the costs of regulation. 
The figures confirm the result of the corollary.  The area marked “A“ contains low values of αe  
and intermediate values of αx ; it increases as δm  grows from 0.75 to 0.5 to 0.4, and it decreases 
as δm  falls to 0.3. However, note that in the last two figures, A contains low rather than 
intermediate values of αx ; if managers are sufficiently impatient, it is impossible that the 
beneficial effects of innovation on productivity are so high that managers would have innovated 
even without regulation. Therefore, the last statement of corollary 3 needs to be interpreted 
correctly: there are values of the remaining parameters for which the restriction that αx  should 
not be too low has no bite. 
The figure also points to another interesting fact. The line forming the upper boundary of the set 
A is decreasing. Hence, starting from such a boundary value, suppose the innovation has a 
weaker positive effect on productivity (αx  increases). For a situation to arise where the firm 
owners’ benefit from regulation, a simultaneous increase in the environmental effect is necessary 
(αe  has to increase). 
Example 2 
I shall now sketch another example for the set-up described in section 2. In this example, the 
output level is not fixed. Many of the insights carry over. However, it turns out that there is an 
additional reason why environmental policy might not increase profits in this setting. 
 Consider a firm that can first carry out a cost-reducing investment, then choose output x and 
emissions level e, taking prices as given. Its production technology is given by general functions 
C(x), E(x) and R(x,e), satisfying the assumptions in section 2. 
Environmental policy is now given by a linear emissions tax t. Accordingly, 
Π(1,I) = maxx ,e px − αxC(x) −αe R(x,e) − te , 
Π(0,I) = maxx px −α xC(x) 
                                                 
7Recall that the left hand side of (3a) is redundant, as it is implied by (3b). 
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where, with a slight abuse of notation αe = α x = 1 for I=0. 
In this setting, the conditions of proposition 1 may still hold in principle. However, compared to 
example 1, a complication arises. Not even condition B is always satisfied: even though the 
investment reduces compliance costs, this does not imply that it is more valuable when there is 
environmental regulation, i.e., that Π(1,1) − Π(1,0) < Π(0,1) − Π(0,0) , or equivalently, 
Π(0,1) − Π(1,1) < Π(0, 0) − Π(1, 0). If the environmental policy corresponds to a marginal 
emissions tax, this inequality holds if and only if 
d
dt
maxx ,e px −α xC(x) − αeR(x,e) − te( )( )  is 
smaller for I=1 than for I=0. By the envelope theorem, the absolute value of this derivative is 
e*(I), the optimal emissions level for the given value of I. Hence, condition B holds if and only if 
the optimal emissions level is lower after the investment than it was before. This need not always 
be the case, because the investment could lead to an expansion of output, resulting in higher 
emissions despite better reduction possibilities. However, if αx  is sufficiently high relative to αe , 
condition B will hold, because the expansionary effect of decreasing marginal production costs is 
relatively small.  
Suppose for instance that C(x,e) = cx2 , E(x)=x and R(x,e) = x x − e
e
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ . Then, it can be shown 
that for parameter values αe =4/9; αx =1/2; p=10; c=2; δ o = 1, there is no choice of taxes and 
managerial discount factors such that condition B holds. Intuitively, in this case, the profit 
increase due to investment is lower with environmental policy than without because regulation 
leads to a major contraction of output, so that the productivity gains become small. 
4. Interpretation 
The model shows that environmental regulation may be beneficial for firm owners when several 
conditions concerning the firm’s internal organization, the nature of the regulation, and the kind 
of potential innovation are satisfied. 
With respect to internal organization, I emphasized the role of incentive problems. On the one 
hand, we saw that incentive problems may play a role in generating the inefficiencies causing 
innovation offsets. On the other hand, greater incentive problems do not necessarily imply that 
regulation is more likely to have positive effects on firms: for regulation to be beneficial from the 
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owner’s point of view, differences in time preferences of principal and agent should be of 
medium size. 
Further, unsurprisingly, the nature of environmental policy is important. In the example, we saw 
that innovation offsets can only arise when policy is sufficiently flexible: a policy that targets 
only end-of-the-pipe technologies cannot be beneficial for the firm.8 In addition, and somewhat 
beyond the modeling framework, the timing of policy is important. Policy that demands the 
immediate reduction of emissions will favor off-the-shelf solutions: firms will not have much 
choice but to respond by applying best available technologies. Firms will only be able to engage 
in innovative activities when some advance warning is given. 
Finally, the nature of potential environmental innovation projects plays a crucial role. In the 
example, we saw that innovation projects with “medium” level productivity effects and high 
abatement cost effects are particularly likely to lead to innovation offsets that dominate 
abatement costs. Beyond that, the time structure matters: it is important that benefits of 
innovation arise mainly in the long run. 
The most interesting element is organizational structure. With respect to this issue, there are two 
further directions for research.  
As a first extension, it is important to relate the likelihood of the organizational inefficiencies that 
are responsible for innovation offsets to the market environment. Intuition suggests that such 
links exist. The nature of product market competition, for instance, helps to determine how likely 
internal inefficiencies are. First, with little competitive pressure, firms with organizational slack 
are more likely to survive.  Further, it is generally harder to measure managerial performance and 
thus to give appropriate incentives when there are few competitors in the market whose 
performance can serve as a yardstick for the performance of the own firm’s managers 
(Holmström and Tirole 1989). This suggests that innovation offsets are more likely in markets 
with little competition. The nature of the market for skilled labor also influences whether 
organizational or strategic inefficiencies are likely to arise. High managerial mobility makes it 
                                                 
8However, even a policy that imposes the adoption of best available processes might be beneficial for a firm if 
internal inefficiencies prevented the adoption in the absence of environmental regulation. Of course, in this setting, 
we would not want to speak of “innovation offsets”. 
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more likely that managers lack appropriate incentives to engage in long-run investments. Finally, 
financial markets might play a role. Well-functioning markets are often said to prevent deviations 
from profit maximization: a firm that does not maximize profits will be a likely target for 
takeovers. While this takeover mechanism is unlikely to be perfect (see Scherer and Ross 1990), 
there should at least be a negative relationship between the effectiveness of the market for 
corporate control and the likelihood of innovation offsets. 
A second extension pertains to the case where regulation has short-term innovation offsets. In 
this case, the organizational failure must be different from the one described in this paper. For 
instance, in some of the cases discussed by Porter, environmental regulation sparked off internal 
communication, eventually leading to the discovery of innovation possibilities. Typically, waste 
management personnel detected pollutants; with the help of other experts the causes of pollution 
were then traced back to the process design (Porter and van der Linde 1995b, p. 122). The 
processes could then be adjusted to alleviate the problem. Without environmental regulation, the 
necessary communication between waste management personnel and process engineers might 
never have taken place. Related issues have been investigated in great depth by Aoki 
(1986,1990), who argues convincingly that a firm’s ability to discover and implement different 
types of innovations may depend strongly on its organizational structure. In particular, job design 
is important: firms that rely heavily on specialization advantages and do not allow their 
employees to spend some time learning about related jobs within the firm might not be aware of 
possibilities for cost reduction that presuppose “horizontal” internal communication. Therefore, if 
typical innovations with positive effects on the environment and on productivity indeed rely 
heavily on internal communication between organizational members, then environmental 
regulations may have positive effects by fostering communication that does not take place on a 
regular basis within the regulated firms. A complementary approach to the one presented here 
would try to determine the conditions under which environmental regulation would increase 
expected profits in a setting with imperfect internal communication.  
5. Conclusions 
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This paper analyzed circumstances under which environmental regulation might raise the 
expected profits of firms, contrary to traditional neoclassical theory. More precisely, I 
investigated whether regulation might lead to such an increase by inducing myopic managers to 
carry out cost-reducing investments with positive effects on the environment. The analysis 
suggests that several additional conditions need to be fulfilled for environmental policy to 
increase firm profits. Thus, this paper finds little support for the argument that the benefits from 
innovation offsets regularly exceed the costs.9 
The more important contribution of this paper is to identify several factors pertaining to the 
likelihood of innovation offsets: the type of regulation, technological factors, market environment 
and firm structure. Hence, while the analysis does not support the view that environmental policy 
with zero or negative costs is realistic, it yields a slightly more subtle contribution. Thinking 
about innovation offsets helps us to understand which circumstances determine the costs of 
environmental policy, as, other things being equal, they are inversely related to the likelihood of 
innovation offsets. 
Among the factors influencing whether innovation offsets take place, the role of firm structure 
seems to be of more general relevance. Although many economists are showing increasing 
willingness to deal with the interior of firms, environmental economists have been reluctant to 
embrace this tendency.10 While many important insights for environmental policy have been 
gained by using abstractions such as the profit-maximizing firm, the time may have come to 
check what we can learn from treating firms as collections of individuals with different goals and 
information-processing capacities. Possibly, the main insight from such an approach would be 
that many of our familiar results carry over unscathed to a modified environment — but even that 
would be a contribution. 
                                                 
9A model that relies more strongly on internal communication problems than on incentive issues might change this, 
but I am not totally convinced. 
10Exceptions include recent papers by Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1993, 1998, 2000) and Sinclair-Desgagné and 
Gabel (1997). 
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